What Constitutes a Binding 'Judicial Admission' (Saiban-jō no Jihaku) in Japanese Civil Litigation and Can It Be Withdrawn?

In the course of Japanese civil litigation, statements made by parties can have profound consequences. One of the most significant is the saiban-jō no jihaku, or "judicial admission." This occurs when a party formally acknowledges the truth of an unfavorable factual allegation made by their opponent. Such an admission is not merely an evidentiary point; it carries substantial procedural weight, binding both the court and the party who made it. Understanding what constitutes a judicial admission, its legal effects, and the stringent conditions under which it might be withdrawn is crucial for navigating Japanese civil proceedings effectively.

Defining a Judicial Admission (Saiban-jō no Jihaku)

The traditional definition of a judicial admission in Japanese civil procedure is a statement made by a party during formal court proceedings (specifically, in oral arguments or designated preparatory proceedings) that aligns with a factual assertion made by the opposing party and is, in substance, disadvantageous to the party making the statement.

Several key elements must be present:

• It must be made by a party to the ongoing litigation (or their duly authorized representative, such as an attorney).
• The statement must be made within the formal framework of the litigation, typically during oral argument hearings (kōtō benron) or in formal preparatory proceedings (benron junbi tetsuzuki) designed to clarify issues and evidence. Statements made outside these contexts, such as in informal settlement discussions or in unrelated matters, do not constitute judicial admissions, though they might still possess evidentiary value as out-of-court admissions.
• The admission must pertain to a fact alleged by the opposing party.
• The fact admitted must be unfavorable or disadvantageous to the party making the admission; that is, it tends to support the opponent's case or undermine their own.
• Critically, it is an admission of fact, not generally of law. While parties might make statements about legal conclusions, the binding effect of a judicial admission primarily attaches to factual matters. (The complex issue of "admissions of right" or legal conclusions will be touched upon later).

The Dual Legal Effects of a Judicial Admission

Once a statement qualifies as a judicial admission, it triggers two principal legal effects:

1. Binding Effect on the Court (審判排除効 - Shinpan Haijo Kō - Preclusion of Adjudication): The court is bound to accept the admitted fact as true. It cannot make factual findings contrary to what has been judicially admitted by a party concerning that specific fact, and no further proof of that fact is required from the party who benefited from the admission. This effect is a direct consequence of the Benron Shugi (Principle of Party Presentation), particularly its second pillar, which dictates that facts not in dispute between the parties form the basis of the court's judgment (see Article 179 of the Code of Civil Procedure, CCP). This serves to streamline proceedings by narrowing the range of contested issues requiring evidentiary scrutiny.
2. Binding Effect on the Admitting Party (不可撤回効 - Fukatekkai Kō - Irrevocability): The party who has made a judicial admission is generally bound by that statement. They cannot freely or unilaterally withdraw the admission or subsequently introduce evidence to contradict it. The underlying rationale for this irrevocability is often attributed to principles akin to estoppel (kinpangen) or, more directly, the need to protect the reliance interests of the opposing party. The party in whose favor the admission was made may have, in reliance on that admission, refrained from gathering or presenting their own evidence on that particular point. To allow easy withdrawal would thus be prejudicial.

The Legal Nature of Judicial Admissions: Traditional vs. Modern Perspectives

There has been an evolution in the theoretical understanding of what a judicial admission represents:

• The traditional view often characterized a judicial admission as simply an expression of the admitting party's perception, knowledge, or belief regarding a particular fact.
• A more modern and prevailing view places greater emphasis on the intentional and procedural aspect of the admission. From this perspective, a judicial admission is seen less as a mere reflection of knowledge and more as a deliberate procedural act—a formal declaration by a party of their intention not to dispute a specific unfavorable fact alleged by their opponent, or, put differently, an act by which that fact is intentionally removed from the field of contention.

The practical implications of this modern, intent-focused view, as suggested by the reference material's commentary, include:

• A broader embrace of statements where a party concedes a fact, not necessarily because they are certain of its absolute truth, but because they strategically deem it a minor point not worth the time or resources to contest. This can further the goal of efficient issue-narrowing.
• A corollary caution that if a party's intention not to dispute a fact is ambiguous or unclear from their statement, courts might be hesitant to find that a binding judicial admission has been made.
• An implicit underscoring of the importance for courts (perhaps through their power to clarify, shakumei-ken) to ensure that parties, especially those unrepresented by counsel, understand the significance and binding nature of their statements before they are treated as formal judicial admissions.

Requirements for the Formation of a Binding Judicial Admission

For a statement to be treated as a binding judicial admission, several conditions must be met:

1. Disadvantageous Nature (Furieki Yōken): The admitted fact must be unfavorable to the party making the admission. This generally means the fact supports the opponent's legal position or weakens the admitting party's own. Scholarly debate exists on how to precisely define "disadvantageous":
   • "Burden of Proof Theory" (Shōmei Sekinin Setsu): A fact is disadvantageous if the opposing party bears the burden of proving it. The admission relieves the opponent of this burden.
   • "Possibility of Losing Theory" (Haiso Kanōsei Setsu): A fact is disadvantageous if its admission could contribute to the admitting party ultimately losing the case, regardless of which party technically has the burden of proof for that specific fact.
     The reference material suggests that Japanese case law, while not entirely definitive, appears more consonant with the Burden of Proof Theory. This theory also aligns well with the common ground for withdrawal of an admission, which often involves proving that the admission was contrary to the truth (as discussed below).
     Some scholars even argue that a specific "disadvantage" requirement is superfluous, contending that any fact agreed upon by the parties (i.e., not in dispute) should, under the Benron Shugi, form the basis of the judgment, with irrevocability being a separate consideration. To mitigate the risk of parties being too easily bound by casual statements, some suggest that a true judicial admission requires the party to have been aware of the potentially disadvantageous nature of their statement at the time it was made.
2. Congruence of Statements (Chinjutsu no Itchi): The admission must correspond to, or align with, a factual allegation made by the opposing party. A party cannot unilaterally "admit" a fact that the opponent has not asserted.
   The concept of an "anticipatory admission" (senkō jihaku) has been part of traditional doctrine: if Party A makes a statement unfavorable to itself, and Party B subsequently explicitly relies on or "adopts" that statement as part of their case, Party A's initial statement could then crystallize into a judicial admission. However, the modern emphasis on the intentional act of "not disputing" has led to critiques of this concept. If Party A made the initial statement without fully appreciating its adverse implications or before Party B formally alleged the corresponding fact, it's questionable whether a true "intention not to dispute" existed at that moment. Some argue that Party A should, in such cases, be given a clear opportunity to withdraw or clarify their earlier statement once Party B seeks to rely on it, with a binding admission only forming if A then reaffirms or fails to retract.
3. Formal Setting (Oral Argument or Preparatory Proceedings): As previously noted, for a statement to have the status of a judicial admission, it must be made within the formal context of either an oral argument hearing before the court or an official preparatory proceeding designed for issue and evidence clarification. Admissions made in other settings, such as informal discussions or unrelated correspondence, lack this specific procedural status.
   There is some academic discussion regarding admissions made during very early-stage issue-sorting or case management conferences. The concern is that if statements made in these more fluid, preliminary phases are too readily treated as irreversible judicial admissions, it might stifle open discussion and hinder the flexible exploration of issues. Some practitioners and scholars have suggested the utility of "non-commitment rules" for such early discussions, where parties can explore factual concessions tentatively without immediate binding effect, with formal admissions being crystallized later as issues become more clearly defined.
4. Admission of Fact (Jijitsu no Chinjutsu): A judicial admission fundamentally pertains to facts. Statements that are purely legal arguments or interpretations of law are generally not binding on the court in the same way as factual admissions; the court is the ultimate arbiter of the law.
   This principle leads to complexities with so-called "admissions of right" (kenri jihaku). These are statements where a party appears to admit the existence or non-existence of a legal right or a legal relationship itself (e.g., "I admit that I owe the debt," or "I acknowledge that the plaintiff owns the property"). Purely as legal conclusions, these are not binding. However, such statements often carry an implicit admission of the underlying facts that would give rise to that legal right or relationship. To the extent that an "admission of right" can be reasonably interpreted as containing an admission of specific supporting facts, those factual components may be treated as judicially admitted. For example, in the case scenario in Chapter 2-8 of the reference material, the defendant Y's statement acknowledging that a certain building was originally owned by X's father (A) is characterized as a statement about a preliminary legal relationship (A's ownership), and thus a legal assertion. However, the commentary suggests that even such legal statements, if made with a clear understanding of their legal implications and a manifest intention not to dispute the point, might under certain conditions be accorded a procedural effect similar to a judicial admission of the underlying factual basis.

Withdrawal of a Judicial Admission (Saiban-jō no Jihaku no Tekkai)

Given the significant binding effect of a judicial admission (the fukatekkai kō or irrevocability), the ability to withdraw one is strictly limited. The law seeks to protect the opposing party's reliance and maintain procedural stability.

Withdrawal is generally permissible only under the following conditions:

1. Opponent's Consent (Aitekata no Dōi): If the party who stands to benefit from the admission (i.e., the opposing party) consents to its withdrawal, the primary basis for irrevocability—protection of reliance—is removed, and the withdrawal is allowed.
2. Admission Induced by a Criminal Act (Aitekata・Daisansha no Keiji-jō Bassubeki Kōi): If the admission was made as a result of a criminally punishable act committed by the opposing party or a third party (e.g., procured through fraud, duress, or bribery that constitutes a criminal offense), the admission is not considered binding and can be withdrawn. A Great Court of Cassation decision of September 21, 1940 (Minshū Vol. 19, p. 1644) supports this.
3. Mistake and Contrariety to Truth (Sakugo katsu Shinjitsu ni Hansuru Koto): This is the most frequently invoked and litigated ground for attempting to withdraw a judicial admission. To succeed, the party seeking withdrawal must typically prove two cumulative conditions:Regarding the "mistake" element, traditionally this was understood as a mistake concerning the factual truth of what was admitted. However, more recent academic theories propose that it could also encompass a mistake regarding the legal significance of the admitted fact – for example, admitting a fact believing it to be legally trivial, only to later discover it has crucial adverse legal consequences. Japanese case law has sometimes indicated that if the "counter-truth" of the admission is proven, the existence of a mistake in making the admission may be presumed (e.g., Great Court of Cassation, November 2, 1921, Minroku Vol. 27, p. 1872). Furthermore, mere negligence on the part of the admitting party in making the mistaken admission generally does not preclude them from seeking its withdrawal, provided the other conditions are met (Supreme Court, December 6, 1966, Shūmin No. 85, p. 569).The requirement to prove "counter-truth" places a substantial burden on the party seeking withdrawal. They must positively demonstrate to the court that the fact they previously admitted is actually false. This high threshold serves to protect the opposing party's reliance on the admission. While some scholars have argued for a lower standard of proof for counter-truth or for a shift in the burden of proof once a genuine mistake is established, the dominant position in case law remains that clear proof of counter-truth is necessary.
   • That the admission was made due to a mistake (sakugo) on their part.
   • That the admission is, in fact, contrary to the actual truth (shinjitsu ni hansuru koto) – also referred to as demonstrating the "counter-truth" or "falsity" (反真実性 - han-shinjitsusei) of the admission. This dual requirement is well-established in Japanese case law, dating back to a Great Court of Cassation decision of September 29, 1915 (Minroku Vol. 21, p. 1520).

Finally, even if substantive grounds for withdrawal (such as mistake and counter-truth) exist, an attempt to withdraw a judicial admission very late in the litigation, in a manner that would cause significant disruption or undue delay to the proceedings, might still be disallowed by the court as a "belated offensive or defensive method" under CCP Article 157(1).

Admissions of Indirect Facts and Auxiliary Facts

The strong binding effects of judicial admissions primarily apply to principal facts. The treatment of admissions concerning indirect facts (kansetsu jijitsu - facts from which principal facts are inferred) or auxiliary facts (hojo jijitsu - facts relating to the credibility of evidence) is more nuanced and debated:

• Indirect Facts:
  • Binding Effect on the Court: The traditional view, supported by case law (e.g., Supreme Court, May 25, 1956, Minshū Vol. 10, No. 5, p. 577), is that judicial admissions of indirect facts do not have a strict binding effect on the court. The court is not obligated to accept an admitted indirect fact if it entertains doubts about its truth or its inferential value, as doing so could improperly constrain the court's free evaluation of all evidence in drawing conclusions about the principal facts. However, alternative scholarly views argue for some level of binding effect to promote issue-narrowing, or at least a limited binding effect whereby the court should proceed on the basis of an admitted indirect fact unless other evidence strongly contradicts it or renders the desired inference unreasonable.
  • Irrevocability by the Party: Consistent with the view that admissions of indirect facts do not strictly bind the court, case law also generally holds that such admissions are more freely retractable by the party who made them (e.g., Supreme Court, September 22, 1966, Minshū Vol. 20, No. 7, p. 1392). However, some scholars argue that even if not binding on the court, the principle of estoppel might still restrict a party from casually withdrawing an admission of an indirect fact once made.
• Auxiliary Facts: Facts that solely pertain to the credibility of a witness or the probative weight of a piece of evidence are generally not considered susceptible to binding judicial admissions. The court retains broad discretion in assessing such matters as part of its overall free evaluation of evidence.

The case scenario in Chapter 2-8 of the reference text illustrates these complexities. A plaintiff (X) sued to nullify a property sale to Y, claiming it was a sham transaction (a "conspired false declaration" under Civil Code Art. 94(1)). X alleged, as evidence of the sham, that X had continued to pay property taxes and ground rent (chidaitō) even after the purported sale. Defendant Y initially admitted that X had continued to pay these expenses but offered an explanation: there was a special agreement (honken tokuyaku) that X would cover these costs for a period because Y was shouldering all property renovation expenses. Later in the proceedings, Y attempted to withdraw this admission, now claiming that Y, not X, had actually been paying the property taxes and ground rent all along.

In analyzing this, the fact of who paid the chidaitō is likely an indirect fact. It's not a direct element of the sham transaction claim but is evidence from which the genuineness (or lack thereof) of the sale might be inferred. If viewed as an indirect fact, then under the traditional interpretation, Y's initial admission would not have been strictly binding on the court, and Y would likely have more leeway to withdraw it or present conflicting evidence, unless the withdrawal was deemed an abusive, last-minute tactic. If, however, one of the more expansive views on the binding nature of admissions of important indirect facts were adopted, Y's attempt to withdraw would face stricter scrutiny, potentially requiring Y to prove both mistake and the counter-truth of the initial admission.

Conclusion

Judicial admissions (saiban-jō no jihaku) play a vital role in streamlining Japanese civil litigation by removing undisputed facts from the ambit of evidentiary contest. Their power lies in their dual binding effect: on the court, which must accept the admitted fact as true, and on the admitting party, who is generally barred from revoking it. However, this powerful procedural device is carefully circumscribed. For an admission to be binding, it must meet specific criteria related to its content, the context in which it is made, and its unfavorable nature to the admitting party. Furthermore, the grounds for withdrawing a judicial admission are exceptionally narrow, typically requiring proof of both mistake and that the admission was contrary to the truth, reflecting the law's commitment to procedural stability and the protection of reliance interests. The nuanced treatment of admissions concerning indirect facts, as well as ongoing scholarly discourse on the precise theoretical underpinnings of admissions, indicates that this remains an area of dynamic legal thought aimed at balancing efficiency, fairness, and the pursuit of substantive justice.