Judicial Admissions in Japanese Civil Litigation: When is a Statement Binding and How Does it Differ from the Principle of Party Presentation's Second Thesis?

Japanese Attorney at Law - Bengoshi L.L.

• 9 min read

In Japanese civil procedure, statements made by parties in court can have significant consequences, particularly when they amount to an "admission" (自白 - jihaku). While the concept might seem straightforward, its legal effects and relationship with overarching procedural principles, such as the Principle of Party Presentation (Benron Shugi - 弁論主義), are layered and complex. Litigants and their counsel must understand precisely when a party's statement solidifies into a binding judicial admission (saiban-jō no jihaku - 裁判上の自白), what those binding effects entail for both the court and the parties, and how this differs from the broader notion of "undisputed facts" within the framework of Benron Shugi. This exploration will delve into the "two faces" of admission in Japan, dissecting its statutory basis and the judicially developed doctrines that govern its power.

The Statutory Starting Point: Article 179 and the Non-Requirement of Proof (Fuyōshōkō)

The Japanese Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) addresses admissions primarily in Article 179, which states: "Facts that a party has admitted in court, and facts that are conspicuous, need not be proven." This "effect of non-requirement of proof" (fuyōshōkō - 不要証効) is the most direct statutory consequence of an admission.

The term "facts that a party has admitted in court" in this context generally refers to facts where the assertions of both parties align—that is, they are undisputed. If the plaintiff asserts a fact and the defendant does not contest it or explicitly agrees with it, that fact typically falls under Article 179.

Importantly, the scope of this non-requirement of proof is quite broad. It is generally accepted in legal scholarship and practice that fuyōshōkō applies not only to "primary facts" (shuyō jijitsu - 主要事実), which are the essential facts directly constituting a legal claim or defense, but also to:

  • Indirect facts (kansetsu jijitsu - 間接事実): Facts from which primary facts can be inferred.
  • Auxiliary facts (hojo jijitsu - 補助事実): Facts that affect the credibility or probative value of evidence (e.g., the authenticity of a document).

This broad application of the non-requirement of proof serves practical purposes in litigation by streamlining proceedings and allowing parties and the court to focus on genuinely contested issues.

Beyond Non-Requirement of Proof: The Doctrinal Concept of a "Judicial Admission" (Saiban-jō no Jihaku)

While Article 179 provides the basic rule for undisputed facts, the term "judicial admission" (saiban-jō no jihaku) often refers to a more specific concept developed through doctrine and case law, which carries weightier consequences than simply dispensing with proof. For a statement to be treated as a full-fledged judicial admission with these enhanced effects, several elements are typically required:

  1. Made in Court Proceedings: The admission must be made during oral argument (kōtō benron - 口頭弁論) or in preparatory proceedings for oral argument. Statements made out of court, while potentially admissible as evidence, do not constitute judicial admissions.
  2. Acknowledgement of Opponent's Assertion: The party must acknowledge a fact asserted by the opposing party. This can include a "leading admission" (senkō jihaku - 先行自白), where a party makes a disadvantageous statement first, which is then adopted by the opponent.
  3. Disadvantageous (Furieki) Nature: The fact admitted must be disadvantageous (不利益 - furieki) to the party making the admission. This is a critical element that distinguishes a binding judicial admission from a mere alignment of assertions on a neutral or favorable fact. The exact meaning of "disadvantageous" has been debated, with theories focusing on the burden of proof (if the admitted fact is one the opponent would otherwise have to prove) or the potential for an unfavorable outcome.
  4. Statement as Part of Oral Argument: The admission must be part of a party's formal factual assertions (soshō shiryō - 訴訟資料), not, for example, testimony given as a witness (even if the witness is a party representative).

This more stringent definition, particularly the inclusion of the "disadvantage" requirement, signals that a judicial admission is not just any undisputed fact but one that carries particular procedural weight due to its potential impact on the admitting party's case.

The Multifaceted Effects of a Judicial Admission

A judicial admission, when satisfying the doctrinal requirements, triggers effects that go well beyond the simple non-requirement of proof outlined in Article 179.

1. Non-Requirement of Proof (Fuyōshōkō)

This is the foundational effect, consistent with Article 179. The admitted fact is removed from the realm of contention and does not need to be substantiated with evidence.

2. Binding Force on the Court (Saibansho Kōsokuryoku - 裁判所拘束力)

This effect, also termed the "effect of excluding adjudication" (shinpan haijokō - 審判排除効), is directly linked to the second thesis of the Principle of Party Presentation (Benron Shugi). This thesis posits: "The court must base its judgment on facts not disputed by the parties." When a judicial admission (particularly on a primary fact) is made, the court is generally bound by it and must treat that fact as established in its deliberations and judgment.

However, this binding force on the court is not absolute across all types of facts. Crucially, it is most strongly applied to admissions concerning primary facts. With regard to indirect facts or auxiliary facts, the prevailing view, supported by Supreme Court precedent (e.g., Supreme Court, May 25, 1956, Minshu Vol. 10, No. 5, p. 577, regarding indirect facts; Supreme Court, April 15, 1977, Minshu Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 371, regarding an admission of a document's authenticity, an auxiliary fact), is that the court is not strictly bound. This limitation is vital for preserving the Principle of Free Evaluation of Evidence (Jiyū Shinshō Shugi - 自由心証主義) under Article 247 CCP, which allows judges to weigh all evidence and draw their own conclusions. If courts were bound by admissions on inferential or credibility-related matters, their ability to ascertain the truth could be unduly hampered.

3. Binding Force on the Admitting Party (Tōjisha Kōsokuryoku - 当事者拘束力)

A judicial admission also binds the party who made it. This is often referred to as the "effect of non-retractability" (fukatekkaikō - 不可撤回効) or the "effect of restricting withdrawal" (tekkai seigenkō - 撤回制限効). Once a party makes a formal judicial admission, especially concerning a primary fact that is disadvantageous to their case, they cannot unilaterally and freely withdraw or contradict that admission later in the proceedings.

This binding effect on the party is not absolute, but withdrawal is heavily restricted. Common grounds for permissible withdrawal include:

  • Consent of the opposing party.
  • The admission having been made due to a criminally punishable act of another person.
  • Proof that the admission is contrary to the truth AND was made due to a mistake (反真実・錯誤の証明 - han-shinjitsu・sakugo no shōmei). Both elements must be proven for withdrawal on this ground.

Similar to the court's binding force, the party's binding force is most rigorously applied to admissions of primary facts. The Supreme Court (e.g., Supreme Court, September 22, 1966, Minshu Vol. 20, No. 7, p. 1392) has indicated that the binding force (both on the court and the party) may not extend to admissions of indirect facts.

Reconciling the "Two Faces" of Admission

The discrepancy between the broad scope of Article 179's non-requirement of proof (covering primary, indirect, and auxiliary facts) and the narrower scope of the strong binding effects (primarily for primary facts) creates what can be seen as the "two faces" of admission. How are these reconciled?

  • The Traditional Explanation ("Binding Force → Non-Requirement of Proof"): A common way to explain this is to argue that because a judicial admission (of a primary, disadvantageous fact) has a binding force on the court and the party (rooted in Benron Shugi and principles of procedural fairness), it naturally follows that such a fact would not require proof. However, this approach struggles to adequately explain why the non-requirement of proof under Article 179 extends to indirect and auxiliary facts, where the corresponding binding force is weak or non-existent. If binding force is the reason for non-requirement of proof, then the scope of both should align.
  • An Alternative Explanation ("Non-Requirement of Proof → Binding Force"): A perhaps more coherent view starts with Article 179 as an independent rule promoting procedural efficiency. Any fact upon which the parties' assertions align (whether primary, indirect, or auxiliary, and regardless of its disadvantageous nature to one party) becomes a fact not requiring proof.
    • From this foundation, the court's binding force (the second thesis of Benron Shugi) arises as a necessary corollary, particularly for primary facts, to prevent surprise judgments (fuiuchi bōshi - 不意打ち防止). If a primary fact is established as undisputed and requiring no proof, it would be procedurally unfair for the court to later contradict this fact in its judgment without giving parties a chance to address the shift. The limitation of this strong binding effect to primary facts serves to balance party autonomy with the court's duty to freely assess evidence in its entirety (jiyū shinshō shugi).
    • Similarly, the party's binding force (non-retractability) can be understood as flowing from the non-requirement of proof. Once a fact is admitted and deemed not to require proof, the opposing party reasonably relies on this state of affairs (e.g., by ceasing efforts to gather or present evidence on that point). To allow the admitting party to freely withdraw the admission would undermine this reliance and could lead to wasted judicial resources by forcing the re-litigation of settled points. This reliance-protection, coupled with principles of estoppel (kingen - 禁反言) and self-responsibility (jiko sekinin - 自己責任), justifies restricting withdrawal.

This alternative model provides a more consistent explanation for the differing scopes of the non-requirement of proof and the robust binding effects.

The Pivotal Role of the "Disadvantage" (Furieki) Requirement

The "disadvantage" (furieki) element is central to the definition of a binding judicial admission but is not explicitly mentioned in the second thesis of Benron Shugi (which speaks of "facts not disputed by the parties") nor in the text of Article 179 CCP. So, what is its precise function?

While the alignment of parties' assertions on a fact is sufficient for that fact to not require proof (Art. 179) and for the court to be generally expected to accept undisputed primary facts (second thesis), the "disadvantage" requirement becomes critical when determining which party is bound by an admission and thus restricted from withdrawing it.

If a party admits a fact that is clearly detrimental to their own legal position (e.g., admitting a primary fact that the opponent would otherwise need to prove to succeed), it is fair to hold that party to their admission. The law presumes that a party will not lightly admit a fact against their own interest unless it is true or they are prepared to accept its consequences. Therefore, the furieki criterion primarily serves to identify the party to whom the tōjisha kōsokuryoku (party's binding force, or non-retractability) attaches.

For the court's perspective (regarding saibansho kōsokuryoku on primary facts), the key is the agreement or lack of dispute between the parties on that fact, rather than whether it is disadvantageous to one particular side. If both parties agree on a primary fact, the court is generally bound to accept it as the basis for its judgment, irrespective of which party might perceive that fact as disadvantageous. The same logic applies to the non-requirement of proof under Article 179: if a fact is undisputed, it needs no proof, whether it's disadvantageous or not.

A Synthesized Framework for Understanding Admissions

Based on the above, we can construct a more integrated understanding of admissions in Japanese civil procedure:

  1. Undisputed Facts & Non-Requirement of Proof (Art. 179 CCP): When parties' assertions on any fact (primary, indirect, or auxiliary) align, that fact does not require proof. This is a baseline rule for procedural efficiency. The "disadvantage" element is not a prerequisite here.
  2. Court's Binding Force (Second Thesis of Benron Shugi): The court is generally bound to accept undisputed primary facts as the basis for its judgment. This stems from the need for procedural fairness and to prevent surprise, building upon the non-requirement of proof. The "disadvantage" element is not the primary driver for this effect; the lack of dispute is.
  3. Party's Binding Force (Non-Retractability of Judicial Admission): A party is bound from withdrawing an admission, particularly when:
    • The admission concerns a primary fact.
    • The admitted fact is disadvantageous (furieki) to the admitting party.
      This effect is grounded in principles of reliance protection, estoppel, and self-responsibility. The "disadvantage" criterion is key to identifying the party who bears this procedural estoppel.

This framework distinguishes the broad evidentiary consequence of undisputed facts from the narrower, but more potent, binding effects of a true judicial admission, particularly concerning the admitting party's inability to retract their statement and the court's obligation to accept certain admitted primary facts.

Conclusion

The concept of "admission" in Japanese civil litigation is more nuanced than it might initially appear. While Article 179 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes a broad principle that undisputed facts do not require proof—an effect that spans primary, indirect, and auxiliary facts—the more stringent consequences of binding the court and, crucially, binding the admitting party (non-retractability) typically come into play when a party admits a primary fact that is disadvantageous to their own case. This is the core of a "judicial admission" in its strongest sense. Understanding this distinction, the role of the "disadvantage" requirement, and the interplay with the Principle of Party Presentation and the Principle of Free Evaluation of Evidence is essential for accurately predicting how a court will treat party statements and for developing sound litigation strategies in Japan.