"It Might Be Stolen, But...": A 1948 Japanese Ruling on Willful Blindness and Criminal Intent

Decision Date: March 16, 1948

A fundamental principle of criminal law holds that to be guilty of a crime, one must possess kōi, or criminal intent. But what does it truly mean to "intend" a criminal outcome? Does it require a direct desire or a certainty of knowledge? What about the person who doesn't want a criminal result, but sees a strong possibility and proceeds anyway—the person who buys goods that seem "too good to be true"? This mental state, often described as willful blindness or conditional intent, lies in the grey area between clear purpose and mere negligence.

On March 16, 1948, shortly after the end of World War II, the Supreme Court of Japan issued a foundational ruling that provided a clear definition for this crucial state of mind, known in Japanese law as mihitsu no kōi (literally, "not-yet-consummated intent"). The case, which involved the purchase of suspiciously cheap clothing, established the standard for when a person's suspicion ripens into criminal intent, a standard that remains central to Japanese jurisprudence today.

The Factual Background: A Suspiciously Good Deal on Clothes

The defendant was charged with zōbutsu kobai, the crime of knowingly purchasing stolen goods (a forerunner to the modern crime of receiving stolen property). The prosecution alleged that on two separate occasions in April 1947, the defendant purchased large lots of clothing—first 75 items, then another 45—from a seller named B. The transactions took place at a private residence.

The defendant's central defense was a lack of knowledge. He argued that he never intended to buy stolen goods and that the seller, B, never explicitly told him the clothes were stolen. He claimed he did not know for certain that the items were contraband, and therefore lacked the necessary criminal intent for the crime. This defense placed the defendant's subjective state of mind at the very heart of the case.

The Supreme Court's Landmark Ruling

The Supreme Court dismissed the defendant's appeal and upheld his conviction. In its judgment, the Court laid out a clear and pragmatic framework for assessing intent in such cases, formally establishing the role of conditional intent in Japanese law.

The Core Legal Principle: Certainty is Not Required
The Court began by stating that to be guilty of purchasing stolen goods, a person does not need "certain knowledge" that the items are, in fact, stolen. It held that what is known as "conditional intent" (mihitsu no kōi) is sufficient.

Defining Conditional Intent
The Court then provided its classic definition of this mental state:

"...the intent to purchase the goods anyway, while thinking that they might be stolen goods."

This definition hinges on the combination of recognizing a possibility and proceeding despite it.

The Evidentiary Standard: Inferring Intent from the Circumstances
The Court further explained that this state of mind does not need to be proven by a direct confession or an admission from the seller. Instead, it can be inferred from the objective circumstances surrounding the transaction. The Court ruled that if, "from the nature and quantity of the goods, the attributes and attitude of the seller, and other various circumstances," a buyer "purchased the goods while harboring the suspicion that 'they might be stolen goods'," then a court is justified in finding that the intent existed.

Applying the Standard to the Facts
The Supreme Court then applied this standard to the defendant's own police statement. In his statement, the defendant admitted that he had become suspicious. He cited three specific reasons:

1. The seller, B, told him he needed to "get rid of the clothes quickly."
2. There had been numerous reports of clothing thefts in the area at the time.
3. The seller was of Korean ethnicity.

The Court found that these three facts were "circumstances sufficient to make a person surmise 'Are these not stolen goods?'" Since the defendant himself admitted that based on these circumstances he "thought they might have been stolen," the Court concluded that his own statement was sufficient to establish the existence of conditional intent.

A Deeper Dive: Unpacking the Theory of "Mihitsu no Kōi"

This 1948 decision has been the subject of extensive academic debate, primarily because it sits at the crossroads of different theories of criminal intent.

The "Will" vs. "Cognition" Debate:
The central debate around conditional intent is whether it requires only a cognitive element (recognizing a risk) or an additional volitional element (a will to accept that risk).

• Will-Based Theories: These theories, often called "acceptance" theories (ninyō-setsu), argue that a person must not only foresee a criminal result as possible but must also, in some emotional or volitional sense, "accept," "approve of," or be "resigned to" that result. Proponents of this view point to the Supreme Court's use of the word 「敢て」 (aete), which can be translated as "daringly" or "to go ahead and do something anyway," as evidence that the court requires this extra volitional step.
• Cognition-Based Theories: These theories argue that the key element is purely intellectual—what the person knew or foresaw. The will is sufficiently demonstrated by the physical act of proceeding with the conduct despite the recognized risk.

Legal commentary suggests that the 1948 Supreme Court decision, despite the use of the word aete, more strongly supports the cognition-based view. The Court's practical test for guilt consists of two elements: "harboring the suspicion" (cognition) plus "purchasing the goods" (the act). It does not require prosecutors to independently prove a third, internal psychological state of "acceptance." The word aete is better understood not as a description of the defendant's internal feelings, but as the court's evaluation of a person who acts in the face of a known risk.

An Objective Standard for Suspicion:
If the crucial element is cognition, the next question is how strong that cognition must be. Does any faint possibility suffice? The Court's reasoning suggests it uses an objective standard to set the bar. It found that the circumstances were "sufficient to make a person surmise" the goods were stolen. This implies an objective test: would a reasonable person in this situation have developed a strong suspicion? The Court first determined that the situation met this objective standard and then used the defendant's own admission to confirm that he subjectively harbored the same suspicion.

A Flaw in the Application:
While the legal framework established by the Court is sound, modern commentators rightly point out a significant flaw in its application in this specific case. One of the three key circumstances the Court relied upon to establish suspicion was the ethnicity of the seller. This clearly reflects the discriminatory social prejudices prevalent in 1940s Japan and would be an entirely unacceptable basis for a legal judgment today. A proper objective standard should be based on the reasoning of a "sincere person expected by the law," free from such biases, not the prejudices of a "normal person" of a particular era.

Conclusion: A Lasting Standard for Willful Blindness

The 1948 Supreme Court ruling is a foundational decision that defined the concept of conditional intent for post-war Japanese criminal law. It established the crucial principle that a defendant does not need to possess certain, confirmed knowledge of a criminal fact to be guilty; recognizing a strong possibility and recklessly proceeding in the face of that possibility is sufficient to establish intent.

The decision provides a practical, two-part test that courts continue to use: first, an objective evaluation of whether the surrounding circumstances would lead a reasonable person to suspect the criminal fact, and second, a subjective confirmation that the defendant did indeed harbor such a suspicion. While the Court's application in this particular case was marred by the prejudices of its time, the core legal principle it articulated has endured. It provides a powerful and necessary tool to combat "willful blindness" and to hold accountable those who choose to profit from a deal that seems "too good to be true."