Intermediaries in Japanese Stimulant Transactions: What Are the Criminal Liabilities for Facilitators and Brokers?

Japanese Attorney at Law - Bengoshi L.L.

27 May 2025 • 10 min read

Stimulant transactions are rarely simple exchanges between a single seller and a single buyer. Illicit drug markets often involve a chain of individuals, including intermediaries, facilitators, or brokers who play various roles in connecting suppliers with end-users or other distributors. Under Japan's stringent Stimulant Control Act, these intermediaries are not shielded from criminal liability. Their specific actions, intentions, and relationship with the principal parties in a drug deal determine the nature and extent of their culpability. This article examines the different ways Japanese law assesses the criminal responsibility of those who facilitate or broker stimulant transactions.

Understanding "Transfer" and "Acquisition" in Stimulant Law

Before delving into the liabilities of intermediaries, it's essential to understand the core prohibited acts of "transfer" (譲渡し - jōtowatashi) and "acquisition" (譲受け - jōuke) under the Stimulant Control Act. Article 17 of the Act broadly prohibits these acts outside of legally sanctioned channels (e.g., licensed medical use).

"Transfer" (Jōtowatashi): In the context of the Stimulant Control Act, "transfer" generally means to pass on the possession of stimulants by granting another person legal or de facto dispositional authority over them. This is not confined to monetary sales; it includes gifts, exchanges, or any act where control and the power to dispose of the stimulants are passed to another. An Osaka High Court judgment from January 30, 1954 (Showa 29), affirmed that consideration (payment) is not a necessary element. Importantly, a transfer of legal ownership is not required, but some level of dispositional authority must be conferred.

"Acquisition" (Jōuke): This is the corollary to "transfer." It signifies receiving possession of stimulants along with the legal or de facto authority to dispose of them.

It's important to distinguish "transfer" from mere "delivery" (kōfu - 交付) where no dispositional authority is granted. While the Stimulant Control Act doesn't explicitly criminalize simple delivery without the transfer of such authority (unlike the Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act, which has a distinct offense for "delivery"), the individuals involved in such a delivery might still be liable for possession. The term "sale" (hanbai - 販売), as used in other contexts like the Penal Code's opium offenses, is typically a narrower concept implying a commercial transfer to unspecified or numerous persons, whereas "transfer" under the Stimulant Control Act is broader.

Case law has further clarified the scope of "transfer":

A landmark Supreme Court decision on December 12, 1960 (Showa 35), held that "transfer" is not limited to the transfer of ownership. Crucially, it ruled that entrusting stimulants to another person for the purpose of them brokering a sale also constitutes a "transfer." This implies that even if the original owner retains legal title, granting someone else the authority to sell (and thus dispose of) the stimulants on their behalf is considered a transfer.
Following this logic, if a person who has been entrusted with stimulants for sale then further transfers those stimulants to a third party, this subsequent act is also a "transfer" (Takamatsu High Court, October 28, 1955 (Showa 30)).
Conversely, merely holding stimulants temporarily for someone who intends to retrieve them later, and then handing them over to an individual sent by the owner, does not necessarily constitute a "transfer" if no dispositional authority is granted to the temporary custodian or the recipient beyond mere physical retrieval. The Osaka High Court, on February 11, 1965 (Showa 40), found that such an act was simply returning custody, not a transfer involving the granting of dispositional rights.

General Criminal Liabilities of Intermediaries in Stimulant Deals

Intermediaries are a common feature in the illicit stimulant trade, often motivated by the prospect of financial gain. Their involvement can take many forms, and Japanese law assesses their criminal liability based on their specific role and intent. Generally, an intermediary in a stimulant transaction might be classified in one of the following ways:

As an Independent Principal Offender (Single Offender - 単独正犯 tandoku seihan):
The intermediary acts as a distinct party in the chain. They first acquire stimulants from a seller and then subsequently transfer those same stimulants to a buyer. In this scenario, the intermediary commits two separate offenses under the Stimulant Control Act: illegal acquisition and illegal transfer. These are typically treated as cumulative crimes (heigōzai - 併合罪), meaning penalties can be aggregated.
As an Accomplice (e.g., Joint Principal - 共同正犯 kyōdō seihan):
The intermediary does not act independently but rather conspires and acts in concert with either the original seller (making them a joint seller) or the final buyer (making them a joint acquirer). Their liability is tied to the principal offense committed by the group.
As an Accessory (Aider and Abettor - 幇助犯 hōjohan):
The intermediary facilitates the commission of the transfer by the seller or the acquisition by the buyer, without being a central actor in the execution of the core criminal act itself. Their actions make the principal offense easier to commit.

The determination of which category an intermediary falls into is highly fact-dependent. Courts will meticulously examine factors such as:

The intermediary's status and their relationship with the other parties.
Their motivations (e.g., profit, obligation).
Their level of criminal intent and awareness of the overall scheme.
The content of any agreements or understandings between the parties.
The specific actions undertaken by the intermediary.
Who ultimately benefits financially or otherwise from the transaction.

A key question often revolves around which party's interests the intermediary is primarily serving. An Osaka High Court case on February 9, 1979 (Showa 54), illustrates this. An intermediary facilitated a sale of stimulants from seller A to buyer B, expecting a "rebate" from B. The intermediary personally received the drugs from A and paid A, even using their own money to cover a shortfall from B. The court concluded that the intermediary was acting primarily on buyer B's side and was therefore a joint principal in B's acquisition of the stimulants, rather than a joint seller with A or merely an accessory to B.

Intermediary as a Principal Offender: Committing Both Acquisition and Transfer

An intermediary can be held liable as a principal offender for two distinct crimes—illegal acquisition and subsequent illegal transfer—if they effectively act as an independent link in the supply chain. This typically occurs when the intermediary:

Is viewed by both the original seller and the final buyer as their direct counterparty. The seller believes they are selling to the intermediary, and the buyer believes they are buying from the intermediary, with little or no direct dealing between the original seller and final buyer.
Conducts two separate transactions. The physical handover of the stimulants and the exchange of money occur in two distinct stages: first from the original seller to the intermediary, and then from the intermediary to the final buyer, often at different times and locations.
Assumes independent financial risk or control. For instance, the intermediary might use their own funds to purchase the stimulants from the original seller before having secured full payment from the final buyer, or they might negotiate prices independently with both parties to secure their own profit margin.

Two case examples illustrate this:

The Tokyo High Court, on September 23, 1975 (Showa 50), dealt with a case involving stimulant raw materials (though the principle is analogous). The defendant (intermediary) was asked by Y to procure raw materials. X offered to sell raw materials to the defendant. The defendant negotiated a price with X, purchased the materials from X using their own money, and then sold them to an associate of Y (named Z), subsequently receiving payment from Y. Since both X (original seller) and Y (on behalf of the final acquirer) viewed the defendant as their direct transactional partner, the court found the defendant guilty of illegal acquisition from X and illegal transfer to Y (via Z).
A Tokyo District Court case on March 22, 1978 (Showa 53), involved an intermediary (defendant) who was informed that X (via Y) wished to sell 100 grams of stimulants for approximately 1.5 million yen. The defendant then told Z that 100 grams were available for 2 million yen. Although the stimulants were physically handed over directly from X to Z in the defendant's presence, Z initially only paid 1 million yen. Both the defendant and X subsequently pursued Z for the remaining balance, and the defendant eventually paid X 500,000 yen. The court determined that, based on the parties' understanding, X considered the defendant the buyer (to whom X was selling for 1.5 million yen), and Z considered the defendant the seller (from whom Z was buying for 2 million yen). The defendant also covered X's hotel expenses related to the transaction. The court concluded that the defendant had effectively acquired from X and transferred to Z.

Intermediary as an Accomplice: Joint Principal or Accessory

When an intermediary doesn't act as an independent dealer but rather collaborates with either the seller or the buyer, their liability is assessed under the principles of complicity, either as a joint principal or an accessory.

Joint Principal (kyōdō seihan): This applies when two or more individuals share a common criminal intent and jointly execute the essential elements of the crime. The intermediary's contribution is integral to the commission of the offense.
Accessory (hōjohan): This applies when an individual, by actions other than the direct execution of the crime's core elements, knowingly facilitates or makes it easier for the principal offender(s) to commit the crime.

The distinction hinges on the intermediary's level of involvement, intent, and the significance of their contribution to the crime's execution.

An Urawa District Court case on March 15, 1978 (Showa 53), found an intermediary to be a joint principal on the seller's side. The intermediary, upon request from X to find a stimulant source, contacted their own supplier Y, negotiated the terms of a deal for 20 grams, collected 400,000 yen from X, went to Y's residence, obtained the stimulants from Y, and then delivered them to X. The court reasoned that the intermediary played a crucial and proactive role in instigating and completing the transfer from Y to X, with Y having a more passive role.
Conversely, the Tokyo High Court, on November 26, 1975 (Showa 50), found an intermediary to be an accessory on the buyer's side. In this instance, when X acquired stimulants from Y, the defendant (intermediary) assisted X by being involved in the advance payment to Y, encouraging X to pay Y the full amount, and participating in X's receipt of the drugs. The court deemed these actions as facilitating X's acquisition.
The Osaka High Court, on March 14, 1984 (Showa 59), overturned a lower court's finding of mere accessory liability and convicted the intermediary as a joint principal. The High Court emphasized that the intermediary's cooperative actions were indispensable and critically important for the successful completion of the acquisition, thus elevating their role beyond that of a mere aider and abettor. This case underscores that the qualitative significance of the intermediary's contribution is a key factor in distinguishing joint principalship from accessory liability.

The Specific Offense of "Brokering" (Shūsen)

Beyond general complicity, the Stimulant Control Act contains a specific provision, Article 41-11, which criminalizes the act of "brokering" (shūsen suru - 周旋する) a transfer and acquisition of stimulants. This offense is punishable by imprisonment for up to three years.

Definition of "Brokering": This term refers to the act of mediating between a prospective transferor (seller) and a prospective acquirer (buyer) to help bring about or facilitate their transaction.

Legislative Intent and Relationship with Accessory Liability: This standalone brokering offense was introduced by an amendment in Showa 48 (1973).

If an intermediary's brokering actions directly lead to a completed (or even attempted) transfer by the seller or acquisition by the buyer, the intermediary will typically be prosecuted as an accessory (aider and abettor) to those principal offenses. Often, the penalties for being an accessory to the main trafficking offenses are more severe than the penalty for the standalone brokering crime.
The primary purpose of Article 41-11 is to create an offense that can punish the act of brokering even if the principals (seller and buyer) do not ultimately complete, or even attempt to complete, the actual transfer or acquisition. It targets the inherent danger of facilitating drug deals, regardless of whether the deal materializes.
The Tokyo High Court, in a judgment on March 31, 1976 (Showa 51), explicitly confirmed this interpretation: if the principal offense of transfer or acquisition occurs, the broker is liable as an accessory; if the principal offense does not occur, the standalone brokering charge under Article 41-11 can still apply.

Elements of Brokering:

The act of mediation itself is sufficient to constitute the offense. The actual transfer or acquisition does not need to take place, nor does a formal contract for sale need to be concluded between the principals.
However, for an act to be considered "brokering," it is generally understood that the intermediary must have been requested or accepted by both the prospective seller and the prospective buyer to act in this mediating capacity. If the request to broker comes from both parties, the offense is typically complete once the intermediary undertakes the mediating actions. If the request comes from only one party, the offense is generally considered complete when the intermediary approaches the other party with the proposal, and that other party agrees to the mediation or indicates an intention to proceed with the transaction through the intermediary's involvement.

Transactions Between Co-Conspirators for Joint Sale: An Exception?

A nuanced situation arises when individuals (e.g., A and B) jointly acquire stimulants with the shared purpose of then jointly selling these stimulants to third parties. If, as part of their internal operational arrangement, A (who might have sourced the drugs) passes a portion of the stimulants to B (who might be responsible for the actual street-level sales), does this internal handing over of drugs between co-conspirators A and B constitute a punishable "transfer" and "acquisition" under the Act?

Generally, such internal transfers between co-conspirators who share a common illicit purpose (like joint sale to others) and are already in joint possession are not treated as new, punishable offenses of transfer or acquisition between themselves. The rationale is:

No New Grant of Dispositional Authority: "Transfer" under the Act implies granting dispositional authority. If A and B are already joint possessors with a shared plan to sell, the movement of drugs between them for the furtherance of that plan doesn't necessarily grant new or distinct dispositional authority to the recipient co-conspirator. They arguably already share such authority over the jointly held drugs.
Analogy to Internal Handling: Such an internal movement is often viewed more like a single person moving an item from one of their hands to the other, rather than a true transfer to a distinct legal personality or for a new, independent criminal purpose between the co-conspirators themselves.
A Tokyo District Court decision on March 10, 1977 (Showa 52), addressed a scenario where two individuals jointly purchased stimulants and then divided the batch between themselves. The court held that this internal division among joint acquirers did not constitute a "transfer" or "acquisition" under Article 17. The court reasoned that the legislative aim of preventing the spread of stimulants and increased opportunities for abuse is not necessarily furthered by penalizing such internal allocations within an existing joint criminal enterprise that is already directed outwards.

Conclusion

The criminal liability of intermediaries in Japanese stimulant transactions is a complex, fact-intensive determination. An individual facilitating such deals can face charges as an independent principal offender (committing distinct acts of acquisition and subsequent transfer), as an accomplice (either a joint principal with, or an accessory to, the seller or buyer), or for the specific offense of brokering under Article 41-11 of the Stimulant Control Act.

The key factors in determining the appropriate charge include the intermediary's specific intent, their precise role and level of participation in the transaction, the nature of their agreements or understandings with the principal parties, and whether they exercised independent dispositional authority over the stimulants at any point during the deal. While the law provides distinct categories of liability, the lines can sometimes blur, requiring a meticulous examination of all surrounding circumstances. However, internal exchanges of stimulants between co-conspirators who are already in joint possession for a common, subsequent illicit purpose are generally not treated as constituting new offenses of transfer and acquisition between those co-conspirators.