Do Corporations Have Human Rights in Japan? Exploring the "Enjoyment Subjectivity of Human Rights"

The question of whether non-human entities, particularly corporations and other organizations (団体 - dantai), can be bearers of fundamental human rights is a complex and significant issue in Japanese constitutional law. This concept, known as "enjoyment subjectivity of human rights" (人権の享有主体性 - jinken no kyōyū shutaisei), has profound implications for how businesses operate, how they are regulated by the state, and how their actions are viewed in relation to the rights of individuals. This article explores the prevailing judicial and academic perspectives in Japan on this topic.

The Foundational Precedent: The Yawata Steel Political Donation Case

The cornerstone of Japanese jurisprudence on corporate human rights is the Supreme Court's Grand Bench judgment in the Yawata Steel Political Donation Case (Yawata Seitetsu Seiji Kenkin Jiken), delivered on June 24, 1970 (Shōwa 45). In this landmark decision, the Court articulated a foundational principle: the rights and duties stipulated in Chapter III of the Constitution of Japan (which enumerates fundamental human rights) are applicable to domestic corporations "to the extent possible by their nature" (性質上可能なかぎり - seishitsujō kanōna kagiri).

This ruling opened the door for corporations to assert certain constitutional protections, moving beyond a purely individualistic conception of human rights. The Court reasoned that companies, as major actors in social and economic life, engage in activities that have a wide-ranging impact and, in turn, require certain freedoms to function effectively. The Yawata Steel decision specifically affirmed a company's freedom to make political donations as a form of political expression, albeit recognizing that such freedom is not unlimited.

Theoretical Justifications for Corporate Human Rights

The Supreme Court's pragmatic stance in Yawata Steel has been complemented and elaborated upon by academic theories, most notably by the influential constitutional scholar, Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe. Professor Ashibe proposed two primary rationales for extending human rights enjoyment to corporations and other organizations:

1. Instrumental Rationale: Corporate activities are ultimately carried out by and through natural persons (employees, shareholders, directors), and the consequences of these activities—both positive and negative—eventually accrue to these individuals. Therefore, protecting the rights of the corporation can be seen as an indirect way of protecting the rights and interests of the natural persons associated with it.
2. Social Entity Rationale: Corporations and other organizations are significant social and economic entities in their own right. They engage in a wide array of activities, contribute to societal development, and interact with other actors, much like natural persons. To effectively fulfill their roles and to be treated fairly within the legal system, they require certain fundamental freedoms and protections.

Professor Ashibe tended to place greater emphasis on the second rationale. This broader "social entity" perspective allows for the recognition of rights even for large, complex organizations where the direct link between corporate action and the specific rights of individual members might be more attenuated. It also supports the use of the term dantai (organization or association) rather than strictly hōjin (juridical person), indicating that the capacity to enjoy human rights is not contingent upon formal legal personality but rather on the entity's functional role in society.

Challenges and Counterarguments: The Individual versus The Organization

Despite the prevailing view, the notion of corporate human rights is not without its critics in Japan. A significant concern, voiced by scholars like Professor Yoichi Higuchi, is that granting human rights to powerful organizations, especially large corporations, could paradoxically lead to the suppression of individual freedoms. Historically, one of the driving forces of modern constitutionalism was the liberation of individuals from the constraints of powerful medieval guilds and established churches. From this perspective, organizations, particularly those wielding substantial economic or social power, might be seen more as potential threats to individual autonomy than as entities deserving of human rights protections in their own right. The argument is that human rights are, by their very essence, attributes of human dignity and individual personhood.

The Scope of Human Rights Enjoyable by Corporations

The principle that corporations enjoy rights "to the extent possible by their nature" necessitates a careful examination of which specific constitutional rights can logically extend to non-human entities.

• Generally Recognized Rights:
  • Property Rights (Article 29): This is perhaps the least controversial. Corporations, as legal owners of assets, are generally understood to be protected against arbitrary deprivation of property.
  • Freedom of Economic Activity (Article 22): This includes the freedom to choose one's occupation or business, and the freedom to conduct business activities. This is vital for corporate existence and operations.
  • Aspects of Freedom of Expression (Article 21): As affirmed in the Yawata Steel case (regarding political donations) and implicitly in cases like the Hakata Station Film Submission Case (Supreme Court, Grand Bench, November 26, 1969 (Shōwa 44)), which assumed media organizations possess freedom of expression, corporations can claim protection for certain forms of speech, particularly commercial speech and political advocacy relevant to their interests.
  • Access to Courts (Article 32): Corporations have the right to sue and be sued, a fundamental aspect of legal personality and due process.
  • Equal Protection (Article 14): Corporations can, in certain contexts, claim protection against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by the state, although the standard for what constitutes impermissible discrimination may differ from that applied to individuals.
• Rights Generally Not Applicable:
  Certain rights are considered inherently personal and are therefore not extended to corporations. These typically include:
  • The right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in its most personal sense (Article 13, though aspects like privacy of business information may find some protection).
  • Freedom of conscience and thought (Article 19) in its internal, individual aspect.
  • The right to vote and other political participation rights reserved for natural persons/citizens (e.g., Article 15).
  • Rights related to family life, marriage, and dignity of the individual in a purely personal capacity (Article 24).
  • The right to receive an equal education (Article 26).
  • The right to work in the sense of an individual's claim to employment (Article 27).

Professor Ashibe suggested that rights "conceivable only in connection with natural persons" are excluded. Ultimately, the determination is made on a case-by-case basis, carefully considering the specific right's nature and purpose, and the character and objectives of the corporation or organization in question.

"Special Limits" (Tokubetsu no Genkai) on Corporate Human Rights

To address the concern that granting rights to powerful corporations might disadvantage individuals or the public interest, Professor Ashibe also developed the concept of "special limits" (tokubetsu no genkai) applicable to corporate enjoyment of human rights. This implies that even when a corporation can claim a particular right, the scope or strength of that right might be less extensive than when asserted by a natural person.

These "special limits" can manifest in several ways:

1. Greater Susceptibility to Regulation: The state may have broader latitude to regulate corporate activities, even those implicating fundamental freedoms (such as political expression or economic activity), compared to similar activities by individuals. The rationale is often tied to the greater societal impact of corporate actions and the need to protect public interests.
2. Discounted Weight in Balancing Exercises: When a corporation's asserted right conflicts with the rights of individuals (e.g., employees, consumers) or with significant public policy objectives, the corporation's right might be given less weight in the balancing process.
3. Denial of Rights under the State Action Doctrine: If a private entity's functions become so intertwined with the state, or if it exercises quasi-governmental powers (approaching the "State Action" theory or kokka dōshi setsu / shiteki tōchi setsu), its ability to claim human rights protections against the state or individuals might be diminished or denied. This is because it may be seen as part of the regulatory or governing apparatus rather than a subject of rights against it.

This nuanced approach attempts to reconcile the practical necessity of recognizing corporate agency and the need for certain protections with the foundational constitutional commitment to individual human dignity.

Alternative Theoretical Perspectives

While the Ashibe-Yawata Steel framework is prevalent, alternative theories exist:

• Denial of Inherent Corporate Human Rights (e.g., Professor Kazuyuki Takahashi): Some scholars, like Professor Takahashi, argue that corporations do not possess inherent human rights subjectivity. When a corporation asserts rights against the government, it is essentially acting as a representative for the collective rights of its human members (shareholders, employees). In internal disputes, a corporation asserts its organizational or disciplinary authority (kiritsuken), not its own human rights. This view maintains a stricter focus on the individual as the ultimate rights-bearer.
• Rights Grounded in Freedom of Association (e.g., Professor Koji Sato): Another perspective, advanced by scholars such as Professor Sato, grounds the rights of organizations in the individual's freedom of association (guaranteed by Article 21). The logic is that to make the individual's right to associate meaningful, the association itself must be able to act and enjoy certain protections for its activities. This theory emphasizes the associational purpose of the entity and inherently limits corporate rights by the principle that they should not unduly infringe upon the rights of natural persons, as that would contradict the very purpose of guaranteeing associational freedom for individuals.

Practical Application: Corporate Rights in Disputes with Members

The abstract theories of corporate human rights find practical application in disputes between organizations and their members. Landmark Supreme Court cases such as the National Railway Workers' Union Hiroshima Local Case (Kokurō Hiroshima Chihon Jiken, Supreme Court, Grand Bench, November 28, 1975 (Shōwa 50)) and the South Kyushu Tax Accountants' Association Case (Minami Kyushu Zeirishikai Jiken, Supreme Court, Third Petty Bench, March 19, 1996 (Heisei 8)) dealt with such internal conflicts.

Interestingly, in these cases, the Supreme Court did not extensively delve into grand theories of corporate personality or the horizontal effect of constitutional rights. Instead, its analysis tended to focus on more specific, often private law-inflected questions, such as:

• Was the action taken by the organization (e.g., expelling a member, compelling a political donation) within the legitimate scope of the organization's purposes as defined by its charter or by law?
• Did the members have a legal duty to comply with the organization's decision or directive?

In answering these questions, the courts considered various factors:

• The nature of the organization (e.g., voluntary association vs. compulsory membership organization with public functions, like a professional bar association).
• The nature of the individual member's right or interest that was allegedly infringed (e.g., freedom of conscience, political freedom).
• The specific corporate action in question and the extent of the burden or disadvantage imposed on the member.

This pragmatic, fact-intensive approach can be seen as an indirect application of constitutional values. The assessment of an organization's "purpose" or a member's "duty to cooperate" is often informed by underlying constitutional principles, even if not explicitly articulated as a direct application of corporate human rights. The key is the concrete balancing of the organization's legitimate interests and operational needs against the fundamental rights of its members.

Conclusion

In Japanese law, corporations and other organizations are indeed recognized as capable of holding and asserting certain fundamental human rights, primarily those instrumental to their functioning as social and economic actors. The Yawata Steel principle of applicability "to the extent possible by their nature" provides a flexible, if sometimes indeterminate, framework. This recognition is tempered by the understanding that corporate rights are not coextensive with individual rights and may be subject to "special limits," particularly when they conflict with individual liberties or overriding public interests.

The precise scope and strength of these rights continue to be shaped by judicial interpretation and academic debate, reflecting an ongoing effort to balance the practical realities of corporate power and agency with the Constitution's fundamental commitment to the dignity and autonomy of the individual. For businesses operating in Japan, this evolving legal landscape means that while they can expect certain constitutional protections, they must also be mindful of the limits and responsibilities that accompany their significant role in society.