A New Era for Council Accountability: Japan's Supreme Court Opens Door to Judicial Review of Member Suspensions

Judgment Date: November 25, 2020, Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench

The internal disciplinary actions of legislative bodies often exist in a delicate balance with the fundamental rights of their elected members and the broader public interest in transparent and accountable governance. For decades in Japan, a significant Supreme Court precedent from 1960 had largely shielded disciplinary suspensions of local assembly members from judicial scrutiny, based on a theory of institutional autonomy. However, in a landmark decision on November 25, 2020, the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court of Japan overturned this long-standing rule, declaring that such suspensions are indeed subject to judicial review. This ruling marks a pivotal shift in Japanese administrative and constitutional law, with profound implications for local governance.

The Facts: A Councilor Suspended, Remuneration Cut

The case originated from Y City, where X, a city council member, faced disciplinary action. Due to remarks X made during a meeting of the council's steering committee, the Y City Council imposed a 23-day suspension from attendance as a punitive measure. As a direct consequence of this suspension, X's remuneration as a council member was reduced by 278,300 yen, in accordance with a Y City ordinance that mandated a per diem deduction for the duration of any such suspension.

In response, X filed a lawsuit against Y City. X sought two primary remedies: first, the revocation of the suspension disposition itself, and second, the payment of the portion of remuneration that had been withheld due to the suspension.

The journey through the lower courts yielded conflicting outcomes. The Sendai District Court (First Instance) dismissed both of X's claims as inadmissible, likely adhering to the prevailing Supreme Court precedent at the time. However, the Sendai High Court (Second Instance) took a different view. It reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case, holding that the appropriateness of a council member's suspension from attendance, particularly when it results in a reduction of remuneration, is a matter subject to judicial review. Consequently, the High Court deemed both of X's claims admissible. Y City appealed this significant ruling to the Supreme Court. The case was considered of such importance that after Y City's petition for acceptance of final appeal was granted by the Third Petty Bench, it was referred to the full Grand Bench for a definitive judgment.

The Landmark Grand Bench Decision (November 25, 2020)

The Grand Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Y City's appeal, thereby affirming the Sendai High Court's conclusion that the suspension was subject to judicial review. This decision explicitly overruled the Supreme Court's own Grand Bench judgment of October 19, 1960, and any other precedents that had barred judicial review for such disciplinary suspensions.

The Court's reasoning was methodical and addressed several key legal principles:

Reasoning - Part I: Establishing a "Legal Dispute"

The Court first established that X's claim for revocation of the suspension constituted a "legal dispute" amenable to judicial resolution. It noted that under the Local Autonomy Act (Article 134, Paragraph 1), local public entity councils have the authority to impose disciplinary punishments by resolution on members who violate the Act or council rules. The types of punishments and the procedures for imposing them are also prescribed by law (Local Autonomy Act, Article 135).

Given this statutory basis, a lawsuit seeking the revocation of a suspension from attendance is a challenge to a disposition made under legal provisions. The Court found that such a dispute, by its very nature, "can be conclusively resolved by applying laws and regulations". This addresses a critical requirement for justiciability: that the matter is capable of final resolution through legal application.

Reasoning - Part II: Weighing Council Autonomy Against a Member's Role

The core of the judgment involved a careful balancing of two important principles: the autonomy of the local council and the fundamental role and responsibilities of an elected council member.

• Council Autonomy: The Court acknowledged that the Constitution adopts the principle of local autonomy by residents. Local councils are constitutionally grounded deliberative bodies that determine the will of the local public entity. In matters concerning their internal operations, the autonomous functions of councils should be respected. Disciplinary punishment of members, aimed at maintaining internal order and ensuring the smooth functioning of the council, is considered a component of this autonomous authority.
• Role and Responsibilities of Council Members: On the other hand, the Court emphasized that council members are elected by residents (Constitution, Article 93, Paragraph 2; Local Autonomy Act, Articles 11, 17, 18) and are entrusted with the crucial responsibility of reflecting the will of those residents in the local government's decision-making processes. This involves participating in council proceedings, debating issues, and voting on matters such as ordinances, budgets, and contracts (Local Autonomy Act, Articles 96, 98, 100, 112, 116).
• Impact of Suspension: A suspension from attendance, the Court noted, directly prevents a council member from engaging in these "core activities". This restriction significantly hinders their ability to fulfill the duties entrusted to them by the electorate. The Court reasoned that given the nature of a suspension and the severity of its impact on a member's ability to function, it cannot be dismissed as merely a temporary restriction of rights that should be left exclusively to the council's internal, autonomous resolution.

Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that while disciplinary suspensions are indeed an exercise of the council's autonomous power, and councils should be afforded a certain degree of discretion in such matters, courts can always judge the appropriateness of these actions. The appropriateness of suspending a local council member from attendance is, henceforth, subject to judicial review. Consequently, X's claim for revocation of the suspension was deemed admissible, and by extension, the claim for payment of withheld remuneration was also found to be admissible.

Deconstructing the Shift: From "Partial Society" to Respect for Autonomy

This 2020 judgment represents a significant jurisprudential shift. The earlier 1960 precedent had largely relied on the "partial society" theory (部分社会論 - bubun shakai ron). This theory posited that certain autonomous groups (like universities, religious organizations, and, by extension, local councils) have internal rules and disciplinary processes that should generally be insulated from judicial review, provided they do not violate fundamental legal principles or public order. However, the "partial society" theory faced criticism for its non-statutory origins and its often broad and somewhat vague application, potentially limiting access to justice without clear, positive legal grounding.

The new ruling effectively moves away from the "partial society" doctrine as the primary basis for limiting judicial review in the context of local council discipline. Instead, it grounds the consideration of limitations in the more concrete, constitutionally-derived principle of "respect for the autonomy of the local council". This autonomy itself stems from the constitutional principle of local governance based on resident self-determination (住民自治の原則 - jūmin jichi no gensoku). This shift means that council autonomy is not an absolute bar to judicial review but rather a significant factor to be weighed by the courts when assessing the legality or appropriateness of a disciplinary action.

The Significance of a Councilor's "Core Activities"

Central to the Supreme Court's reasoning was the impact of suspension on a council member's "core activities". The Court identified these activities as participating in council proceedings, engaging in debate, and casting votes. These are not merely procedural functions; they are the essential means by which an elected representative fulfills their mandate from the residents. Impeding these activities through suspension, therefore, is not just a matter concerning the individual councilor but also strikes at the heart of representative democracy at the local level, potentially disenfranchising the residents who elected that member. By linking these core activities directly to the constitutional principle of resident-based local autonomy, the Court underscored the gravity of disciplinary measures that curtail them.

Judicial Review with Discretion

It is crucial to understand that this ruling does not empower courts to freely substitute their own judgment for that of the local council in every disciplinary matter. The Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that councils retain "a certain degree of discretion" in imposing punishments. Judicial review in such cases is unlikely to be a de novo reassessment of the entire disciplinary decision. Instead, it will likely focus on whether the council's action was a clear abuse of its discretion, was based on illegal grounds, violated constitutional principles, or was otherwise patently unreasonable.

Justice U, in a supplementary opinion to the Grand Bench judgment, reinforced this understanding while emphasizing the constitutional underpinnings of judicial access. He argued that the right to a trial (Constitution, Article 32) and the judiciary's duty to exercise judicial power (Constitution, Article 76, Paragraph 1) mean that any external constraints on judicial review should be exceptional and strictly limited to situations where there is a clear constitutional basis for such limitation. In his view, denying judicial review for the suspension of local council members actually harms, rather than protects, the principle of resident autonomy because it prevents scrutiny of actions that sideline elected representatives. Justice U also drew a distinction between local councils and the National Diet, noting that the Diet enjoys explicit constitutional provisions regarding its autonomy (e.g., Article 55 on judging the qualifications of its members, Article 51 on immunity for speeches and votes) which local councils do not possess.

Implications and Unanswered Questions

This landmark decision opens several avenues for consideration and will undoubtedly influence future legal practice:

• Impact on Other Disciplinary Actions: The ruling directly addresses "suspension from attendance." Its precise applicability to other forms of council discipline—such as a reprimand, a forced apology, or expulsion—remains to be seen. However, the fundamental reasoning, particularly the emphasis on balancing council autonomy with the representative functions of members, will likely shape how courts approach challenges to these other measures. Expulsion (除名 - jomei), being the most severe punishment, was already subject to judicial review under the old precedent.
• "Direct Challenge" vs. "Premise Challenge" Litigation: Previously, even if a direct challenge to a disciplinary action like suspension was barred, courts sometimes allowed lawsuits where the validity of the disciplinary action was a preliminary question (premise challenge) to another claim, such as a suit for damages for defamation or, as in X's case, for the payment of reduced remuneration. With this new ruling directly permitting challenges to the suspension itself, the strategic landscape for such litigation will change.
• Influence on Other "Partial Societies": While the judgment is specifically about local councils and moves away from the general "partial society" theory in this context, its critique of the old framework and its emphasis on positive legal and constitutional grounds for autonomy might have ripple effects on how courts analyze internal disputes in other autonomous organizations.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's November 2020 decision is a watershed moment for local governance in Japan. By overturning a six-decade-old precedent, it has significantly enhanced the accountability of local councils by affirming that disciplinary suspensions of their members are subject to the scrutiny of the courts. The judgment carefully balances the need to respect the internal operational autonomy of councils with the imperative to protect the fundamental roles and rights of elected representatives who serve as the voice of their constituents. This ruling is not just a technical point of administrative law; it is a robust affirmation of the judiciary's role in upholding the principles of representative democracy and resident autonomy at the local level, marking a significant step forward in the ongoing development of Japanese constitutional and administrative jurisprudence.